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I. Introduction
The process sociologist, Norbert Elias (2012, p.89) maintained that Caxton’s 
comment in his fifteenth century treatise on courtesy that ‘things that were once 
permitted are now forbidden’ could stand as the ‘motto’ for the European 
civilizing process that was to come. The main course of development which 
would revolve around the formation of modern states and the significant 
pacification of the relevant societies shaped different related spheres of social 
interaction. According to Elias, they included the standards that governed bodily 
functions, changes in table manners and (of particular importance for the present 
discussion) shifts in emotional responses to cruelty and violence. His writings 
were less consistent on the subject of whether actions that were once permitted 
in relations between states have become forbidden in the most recent phase of 
the modern states-system. The main objective of the following discussion is to 
synthesise elements of process sociology and the English School in order to 
determine whether the current era is distinctive if not unique. The paper begins 
with a brief discussion of Elias’s reflections on international relations and 
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emphasises their importance for social-scientific analyses of political violence.
II. The ‘Civilizing Process’ and International Politics
Throughout his writings, Elias portrayed international politics as ‘the realm 
of recurrence and repetition’, to use an expression made famous by Martin 
Wight (1966). The argument was that no higher monopoly of power can restrain 
separate states whose self-reliance for security and survival invariably breeds 
distrust and mutual suspicion, and whose behaviour in the heat of particular 
conflicts has often been characterised by ‘high fantasy content’ world-views that 
have resulted in unrestrained violence against demonised adversaries (see the 
discussion of double-bind processes in Elias, 2007, p. 162ff, p. 171ff). Relations 
between states in recent times were described as having many of the same 
qualities as interactions between social groups in the age of humanity’s alleged 
‘barbarism’ (Elias, 2013a, p. 215). There were no fundamental differences 
between the use of poisoned arrows in early warfare to kill or main enemies and 
the willingness to employ the technology of ‘mass incineration’ in the nuclear 
era. The main contrast is that the members of (internally) highly-pacified 
societies today regard themselves as considerably more civilized and restrained 
than their ‘savage’ and supposedly more war-prone ‘tribal’ ancestors. In his 
reflections on the nuclear era, Elias (2010a) contended that the sense of 
belonging to more civilized societies might not save the superpowers from all-
out war (see van den Bergh (1992) for a different interpretation from within the 
standpoint of process sociology of the role of nuclear weapons in encouraging 
‘reciprocal restraint’). 
Elias maintained that the modern states-system might suffer the fate of its 
predecessors where the great powers that survived earlier ‘elimination struggles’ 
descended into ‘hegemonic wars’ that were fuelled by ‘hegemonic intoxication’ 
(Elias, 2010a, p. 101). In at least one respect, however, the contemporary phase 
of world politics appeared to be unique. Modern ‘civilized’ attitudes to violence 
– in particular repugnance towards cruelty – had led to widespread revulsion 
against genocide. The interweaving of societies meant that more and more 
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people were aware of distant suffering and felt ‘a duty to do something about the 
misery of other human groups’ even though global commitments to eradicate 
poverty remained limited (Elias, 2013a, p. 29). Rising levels of global 
interconnectedness had created some incentives and pressures to tame selfish 
ambitions and to cooperate to deal with common difficulties. ‘Unions of states’ 
had the potential to replace ‘individual states’ as ‘the dominant social unit’ 
although national attachments continued to exercise a ‘drag effect’ on efforts to 
build powerful international organisations (Elias, 2010b, p. 147, p. 181, pp. 
195–7; Elias, 2011, p. 165ff). 
Those different comments about world politics suggest that the modern 
states-system is very finely-balanced between opposing social and political 
tendencies. Elias (2011, p. 17, p. 174) did not exclude the possibility that 
societies will work out how to live together non-violently as a result of inter-
generational learning processes over the remaining period in which human life 
can be sustained on the planet, assuming that humanity does not destroy itself 
first. But what is true of ‘civilized’ groups was also valid for what there is in the 
way of a global civilizing process in the technical meaning of that term.(2) In 
stable, civilized societies where the state’s monopoly of physical power is the 
ultimate constraint on the use of force, the restraints on violence can break down 
quickly if people become anxious about their security or survival. The risks are 
It is important to stress that Elias used the idea of a civilizing process in two ways – first, to 
describe European patterns of development between approximately the fifteenth and twentieth 
centuries and, second, to refer to broadly similar tendencies in many other societies and in 
their external relations to some extent. To understand a ‘civilising process’ in this second and 
more technical sense, he argued, it is important to focus on ‘the problem of how people can 
manage to satisfy their elementary animalic needs’ without ‘reciprocally destroying, 
frustrating, demeaning or in other ways harming each other time and time again in their search 
for this satisfaction’ (Elias, 2013a, p. 35). The emphasis was on controls of violence and 
standards of self-restraint. The technical meaning of civilizing process also included more 
positive characteristics such as ‘the extent and depth of people’s mutual identification with 
each other and, accordingly, the depth and extent of their ability to empathise and capacity to 
feel for and sympathise with other peoples in their relationships with them’ (Elias, 2013a, p. 
122). 
(2)
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especially great in international politics where one of the central preconditions 
of the modern European civilizing process - the existence of a monopoly of 
power that can punish transgressions of the dominant social standards of 
restraint – is absent. Civilizing restraints on violent harm could be expected to 
remain brittle in the relations between political communities that are subject to 
the tensions that were described earlier (Elias, 2010b, p. 199ff). There had been 
an unmistakeable general long-term tend towards the social and political 
integration of the species and reason to believe that what has come to be known 
as globalisation is still at an early stage of development. But the ‘immense 
process of integration’ that the species has undergone was not guaranteed to 
survive. A ‘dominant disintegration process’ could emerge that would throw 
some achievements in taming international politics into reverse (Elias, 2010b, p. 
148, p. 202). 
Elias’s reflections on world politics frame the following preliminary 
discussion of how far the contemporary international system is different from its 
predecessors, in part because of the ‘civilized’ nature of many of its constituent 
political parts. The first task is to consider how closer connections between 
process sociology and the English School analysis of international society can 
contribute to solving the puzzle that has been posed. The society of states which 
Elias’s writings did not consider is critical for understanding agreements as well 
as disputes about what is permissible and forbidden in world politics. The 
second part of the following discussion considers three distinctive features of the 
contemporary society of states. They are the taming of the great powers, the 
expansion of international society, and the emergence of cosmopolitan standards 
of self-restraint. A third and final task arises in response to Elias’s tendency to 
focus on the absence of an equivalent to the ‘civilizing process’ in international 
relations. It is to lay the foundations for an explanation of a modern global 
civilizing process (in the technical sense of the term) that is unprecedented in the 
history of the Western states-systems. 
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III. The Civilizing Process and International Society
Elias maintained that the state’s monopolisation of violence and taxation 
imposed external constraints on conduct that led to domestic pacification, to 
higher levels of interconnectedness, and to new forms of attunement between 
members of the same society. He repeatedly emphasised that there has been little 
evidence of equivalent developmental patterns in the relations between societies. 
His writings do not contain a conception of ‘the anarchical society’ – of shared 
interests in preserving international order that result in standards of restraint in 
the absence of a higher monopoly of power (Bull, 2001). There was no 
systematic discussion of how the society of states was linked with long-term 
civilizing processes within and across its constituent parts, or of how the 
European civilizing process had been expressed in, and also shaped by, the core 
institutions of international society. 
Many of the rituals and protocols of modern diplomacy are a product of the 
court society that Elias (2006a) regarded as the key to understanding core 
features of the civilizing process – the absolutist court of Louis XIV. But other 
institutions of international society such as the contrived balance of power, as 
well as the belief that the great powers have special responsibilities for 
maintaining international order, are examples of agreed standards of self-
restraint that are evidence of some parallels to intra-societal civilizing processes. 
Many of the ‘civilizing’ dynamics that may emerge whenever people are forced 
together in longer webs of social interconnectedness are evident in the rise and 
development of societies of states. They include, first, a shift in the relative 
power of the fear of coercion and the restraints that people impose on each other 
and on themselves because of the inner compulsion of ‘conscience’ and notions 
of right conduct; second, the emergence of social standards that demand more 
intensive forms of self-regulation and make the control of violent and aggressive 
impulses critical for social esteem; and third, rising levels of mutual dependence 
that create incentives to develop more detached and realist understandings of 
other people and also to become more agreeable in dealings with others that can 
pave the way for a widening of ‘the scope of emotional identification’ (Fletcher, 
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1997, p. 82). The analysis of the European civilizing process therefore opens the 
way to a comprehensive interpretation of several interconnected long-term 
trends that stretch from the early stages of state-formation in the West and the 
emergence of distinctive diplomatic institutions through to the globalisation of 
the Western model of political community and the emergence of the 
contemporary universal society of states. They should be regarded as the inter-
related parts of one overall pattern of development that has affected humanity as 
a whole. Within that framework it then becomes possible to explore the extent to 
which ‘things that were once permitted are now forbidden’ in the relations 
between states.  
IV. The Taming of the Great Powers
One of the central themes in the study of the civilizing process – namely 
that the dominant tendencies evolved ‘behind the backs’ of people who were 
pulled in one direction or another by social forces that no-one controlled – has 
particular relevance for understanding the central power relations in any 
international system (Elias, 2007, p. 77). In the modern period, the great powers 
came under greater pressure to recognise that they were locked together ‘in the 
production line of the same machinery’ with the result that ‘sudden and radical 
change in one sector’ could cause generalised disruption that no national 
government could ignore (Elias, 2012, p. 353). Self-interested reactions to 
lengthening entanglements that were driven by fear and suspicion as well as by 
geopolitical rivalry and military conflict often predominated. But increasingly 
destructive warfare also led to recognition amongst the great powers that 
international order could not be left to chance but had to be preserved through 
mutual restraint, diplomatic consultation and collective action. 
Detailed historical works have explained how peace settlements at the end 
of major wars shaped the long-term trend towards the greater collective 
management of the international system (Clark, 2005, p. 65, p. 84; Osiander, 
1994). The European states realised that they were no longer what Vattel ([1758] 
1863, III, p. iii) described as ‘a confused heap’ with little reason to concern 
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themselves with ‘the fate of others’, but had an overriding interest in being 
attuned to one another in a great ‘republic’ that was responsible for preserving 
the balance of power and for avoiding hegemonic conflicts. Following the 
Napoleonic wars, the major powers supported the principle that they should use 
their combined authority as the ‘great responsibles’ to guide the international 
system through its inevitable political crises. In a sequence of post-war 
settlements, their successors constructed constitutional frameworks that 
embedded expectations of ‘strategic restraint’; they attempted to reach shared 
understandings of the forms of national self-control that were essential if 
international order was to survive and if international society was to function 
smoothly (Ikenberry, 2001; van Benthem van den Bergh, 1992, p. 30ff). 
What has been called the obsolescence of force in the relations between the 
great powers is one phase of a longer civilizing process in which larger territorial 
monopolies of power became more dangerous to each other; they were pushed 
towards recognising the need to act in concert to bring the struggles for power 
and security that tied them together under at least partial collective control. 
Various peace conferences and the proliferation of permanent international 
institutions are examples of how parallels to intra-societal developments with 
respect to ‘social constraints towards self-constraint’ appeared in the relations 
between states; they are evidence of the ‘spread of foresight and restraint’ 
(which Elias, 2012, p. 418ff regarded as a central element of the whole European 
civilizing process) across greater distances. The former have been important for 
the acquisition of higher levels of mutual attunement and for developing 
standards of self-restraint that have partly reconciled different national 
conceptions of what is permissible and forbidden in the relations between 
sovereign peoples. Such conferences and institutions have been the global 
manifestation of what Elias (2013b, p. 268) regarded as the principal ‘direction’ 
of any civilizing process, namely the willingness to resolve ‘conflicts and 
disagreements on the basis of jointly acknowledged rules, instead of by 
violence’.   
The twentieth century is often described as one of the most violent in human 
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history, but the Second World War was a turning-point in the evolution of 
international society. The subsequent ‘long peace’ between the great powers 
represents the renewal of an earlier long-term trend towards a ‘civilianisation’ or 
‘civilizing’ of the military domain that had been interrupted by short-lived, 
failed experiments in totalitarian rule that were initiated by regimes that 
displayed an ambivalent relationship with, if not outright contempt for, European 
standards of civilization (Kershaw, 2005). In the industrial regions of the world, 
the past few decades have witnessed the re-emergence of the social trend that 
was celebrated by many Enlightenment thinkers for whom glorifying war and 
cherishing military values were the hallmarks of the ‘obsolete’ and ‘barbaric’ 
age that commercial society seemed to be destined to eradicate (van Doorn, 
1984, pp. 44-5). Echoing earlier themes in the British liberal tradition including 
themes that were central to the writings of Sir Norman Angell, some argued in 
the late 1980s that warfare was about to suffer the same fate as slavery and 
duelling, and to fall out of favour because of shared convictions about what it 
means to be a ‘civilized’ people (Ray, 1989; Mueller, 1989, p. 217) for the thesis 
that war is ‘immoral, repulsive and uncivilized’ as well as ‘ineffective’ and 
‘futile’). Such standpoints rehabilitated perspectives on world politics that 
seemed to have been swept aside by the triumph of realist or neo-realist 
pessimism.  Early in the twentieth century, Sir Norman Angell (1912, p. 20ff, 
pp. 272-3) argued that ‘the possibility of one part injuring another without injury 
to itself [had] been diminished’. A general dampening of the ‘impulses to injury’ 
was taking place as part of the same ‘civilizing’ of drives that had already led to 
the abolition of forms of violence that included the aristocratic duel as well as 
state torture that had provided ‘public amusement’ (Angell, 1912, pp. 209-10). 
Such ideas were discredited in the inter-war period but, because of the post-
Second World War ‘long peace’ and rapidly rising levels of human 
interconnectedness, they have proved to be insightful reflections on long-term 
potentials that distinguish the modern states-system from its immediate 
predecessors. 
Wight speculated – and Elias broadly agreed with his judgment – that, if the 
17
Social Standards of Self-Restraint in 
World Politics
past is any guide, then states-systems appear to be destined to end in violence 
either as a result of internal elimination contests that lead to empire or because 
of conquest by an eternal power. The modern society of states may prove to be 
the great exception. Recent trends suggest that there is a high probability that 
‘the frequency of war will sharply decline’ in future as far as the relations 
between the major powers are concerned (see Lebow, 2010a, p. 268; Lebow, 
2010b), although there is no guarantee that it will disappear entirely (Jervis 
2011). The nuclear revolution had a ‘civilizing effect’ by pushing the 
superpowers to settle major differences non-violently. The idea that industrial 
states can resolve major differences by force is now absurd although violence in 
relations with other societies seems likely to survive (Buzan, 2009). With the 
unique change in the relative power of economic as opposed to geopolitical 
interconnectedness (Buzan and Little, 2000), the traditional warrior codes that 
valued displays of male courage or exhibitions of military prowess have lost 
their earlier significance as a source of personal meaning and as a means of 
securing social esteem. The great majority of people in highly-pacified societies 
attempt to realise such aspirations through unwarlike commercial, administrative 
and related pursuits (Lebow, 2010a, p. 268). Unprecedented social standards of 
self-restraint with respect to the use of force are now in place. The relationship 
between violence and civilization has been transformed at the level of relations 
between the great powers.
V. The Expansion of International Society
The expansion of the international society of states from Europe to the rest 
of the world is a second fundamental transformation of the most recent phase of 
world politics. With the successive waves of colonial expansion, non-European 
peoples were incorporated within political and economic structures that were 
suffused with pernicious assumptions about the racial and cultural superiority of 
‘civilized’ peoples. The belief that international society was an exclusive 
‘European club’ was defended on the grounds that non-European societies were 
less ‘civilized’. Their gradual acceptance as social equals – a process that is still 
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far from complete – was part of a profound alteration of the course of the 
European civilizing process. 
In terms of its membership, contemporary international society is the first 
universal society of states in human history, although its core political and 
economic institutions are far from ‘post-European’ or ‘post-Western’. They 
remain biased towards Western values and interests that reflect the continuing 
influence of related standards of civilization. It is important, however, to stress 
the long history of disputes about European conceptions of civilization. 
European societies had little compunction in violating ‘civilized’ standards of 
self-restraint in relations with ‘savages’. The double standard of morality in 
which one ethical code applied within the state and another in relations with 
other states existed in a more extreme form in the relations with Europe’s 
outsiders where genocide, economic exploitation and cultural humiliation were 
widespread (Elias, 2008, p. 113ff). So great were the power disparities between 
imperial overlords and colonial peoples that the former could often behave as 
they pleased, ignoring the imperatives of conscience in other spheres. There was 
little or no incentive to think from the standpoint of others or to make political 
concessions to people who could offer little in return. The process of civilization 
licensed the removal of many of the taboos against violence that were observed 
in relations between Europeans but, especially during the European 
Enlightenment, it also provided the moral and cultural resources for condemning 
those who disregarded ‘civilized’ constraints within their own societies as they 
proceeded to dominate, exterminate, displace, enslave and in other ways harm 
subjugated peoples. The crucial contrasting standpoint was that imperial 
cruelties clashed with the normative ideals that were integral to the collective 
identities of ‘civilized’ peoples. Demands for the observance of new standards 
of restraint in relations with the colonies developed in tandem with struggles to 
organise societies around the universalistic and egalitarian dimensions of the 
civilizing process.
The nineteenth-century ‘standard of civilization’ embodied the peculiar 
ambiguities of the civilizing process; it is one of the best illustrations of its 
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connection with the structure of international society and its expansion. The 
doctrine reasserted a right to colonise, judge and transform colonised societies 
while holding out the promise, on the assumption that imperial rule would 
ensure progress and civilization for ‘backward’ regions, of eventual membership 
of the European society of states (Gong, 1984; Suzuki, 2009). From the early to 
mid-nineteenth century, the dominant principles of domestic and international 
legitimacy were shaped by the conviction that the overseas empires should be 
governed, to a greater extent than ever before, by constraints on violent and non-
violent harm that were the hallmarks of a ‘civilized’ existence (Crawford, 2002). 
Images of permissible and forbidden forms of colonial administration shifted 
radically with the result that the constituent parts of international society came 
to believe that it was no longer acceptable to take colonial territories by force or 
to seize, transport and sell other peoples. A major transformation of attitudes to 
the relationship between violence and civilization took place in the relations 
between dominant and subordinate societies. 
One of the distinguishing features of the modern states-system is the 
notable, but incomplete, achievements that have occurred in weakening the 
contrasts between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘barbaric’. A major difference is evident 
in changed attitudes towards public displays of supposed racial or cultural 
superiority over others, towards acts of humiliation and stigmatisation, and 
towards other manifestations of the conviction that others do not deserve the 
equal respect that has come to be regarded as the birthright of all human beings. 
For ‘civilized’ peoples, it is clearly no longer morally acceptable to invoke 
differences of race and civilization to license various traditional forms of violent 
and non-violent harm against ‘natural inferiors’. To that extent at least, there has 
been an enlargement of the boundaries of moral concern and a partial widening 
of the scope of emotional identification between peoples. But such advances are 
uneven and limited. The speed with which dichotomies between the ‘civilised’ 
and the ‘savage’ emerged in the aftermath of 9/11 is a reminder of how quickly 
colonial imaginaries can be rekindled under conditions of fear and insecurity. 
The tenacity of such pernicious contrasts must be understood in long-term 
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perspective. They are the cultural relics of earlier phases of the process of 
civilization that included the divisions between the ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ in the 
early stages of European state-formation, in the successive waves of ‘medieval’ 
or ‘early modern’ outward expansion, and in the nineteenth century colonial era 
where the modern society of states was shaped by powerful derogatory 
assumptions about ‘less advanced’ peoples who blocked the path of their 
‘civilized’ superiors (Keal, 2003). 
Those developments explain how a catastrophic ‘loss of meaning’ led to 
‘deep mourning’ and collective distress and ‘depression’ from which colonised 
peoples have not recovered, and which may still be poorly understood (Elias, 
2013a, pp. 83-4). Contemporary ‘anti-Western’ political movements that 
proclaim the superiority of ‘traditional’ belief-systems are an unsurprising 
reaction to a European civilizing process that legitimised – and was shaped by – 
colonial violence and calculated strategies of humiliation (Kull, 2011). Their 
attitudes and behaviour must be considered in conjunction with the changing 
power balances between European and non-European peoples that found 
expression in the pressures on colonial subjects to acknowledge their racial and 
cultural ‘inferiority’, and to accept their absolute dependence on European 
societies for access to ‘civilization’ and progress. Those most recent 
manifestations of the ‘cultural revolt against the West’ that has transformed the 
society of states cannot be dismissed then as ‘pathological’ world-views that 
supposedly demonstrate, as stated in the ‘new barbarian thesis’, an inherent 
cultural inability to adapt to modern social structures and belief-systems; they 
are descended from earlier struggles to win respect for ‘traditional’ values and 
customs (see Jacoby, 2011; Mishra, 2012; Pasha, 2012). Crucial political 
challenges result from the invalidation of earlier predictions about the voluntary 
acceptance of European ‘civilized’ standards across all non-European regions. 
The quest for a global agreement on standards of self-restraint must now start 
from very different premises and with a deeper awareness of the need for 
cultural justice in the context of widening differences that include revived 
politico-religious attachments (Shapcott, 2001; Shani, 2014).
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Various ‘emancipation struggles’ in the West reduced the social gradient 
between the former colonial and colonised peoples as well as between rulers and 
ruled, men and women, and adults and children to some extent (Elias, 2013a, p. 
28). The former included campaigns to abolish the Atlantic slave trade and 
chattel slavery, to end apartheid and conceptions of racial and cultural 
supremacy more generally, and to protect individuals and minorities from 
violent and non-violent harm whether at the hands of their own government or 
perpetrated by external enemies in times of war. As integral parts of that process, 
anti-colonial struggles to gain inclusion in the society of states were shaped by 
multiple forces including the reality that many ‘first generation’ national leaders 
were educated in European metropolitan universities and attracted or exposed to 
claims that the progressive ideals of freedom and equality were hallmarks of 
‘civilization’. Crucial was the awareness of an old tension within the European 
civilizing process between those who believed that ‘no holds were barred’ in 
relations with ‘savages’ and their political opponents who maintained that 
peoples who committed colonial cruelties forfeited the right to call themselves 
civilised. 
Counter-hegemonic movements that resisted European imperialism revealed 
how the participants in emancipation struggles can acquire power and secure 
legitimacy by exposing tensions within the dominant ideologies and by 
weakening the power base of traditional elites that claim to live by high ethical 
ideals. Political and ideological struggles between superpowers that were 
anxious to flourish their anti-colonial credentials in the struggle to win Third 
World support were also important factors in the expansion of international 
society. Changing conceptions of what was permissible and forbidden increased 
the reputational costs of trying to hold onto the overseas empires in an era when 
the political resolve and material capabilities of European governments had 
declined (Crawford, 2002). Anti-imperial emancipation struggles prevailed 
because major changes in the power balance between Europe and its colonies – 
and between the traditional European great powers and the superpowers – 
coincided with the collapse of the moral defence of the empires that had been 
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central to the European civilizing process.
International society is no longer supported by a widespread belief that the 
constituent members belong to a single civilization (as opposed to being caught 
up in a Western-initiated civilizing process). Process sociology contains valuable 
resources for diagnosing the current condition that can be described as the 
unfinished transition from the conviction that a single civilization – whether 
European, Chinese, Japanese and so on – is surrounded by ‘inferior’ groups to 
the recognition that multiple cultures and civilizations (or civilizing processes) 
now face each other as moral equals. Different peoples may be at a very early 
stage in understanding how they developed through diverse, but always inter-
related, civilizing processes that have become ever more intricately interwoven. 
The dawning awareness of those realities which is the manifestation of shifting 
power relations is a central feature of the ‘most recent phase’ of civilizing 
processes in the West and in other regions that have undergone related 
developments. The global expansion of international society is similar to other 
phases of human history in which peoples who had been forced together 
confronted challenging questions about whether they could agree on standards 
of restraint that enabled them to co-exist amicably. As in the past, the upshot of 
social and political inequalities is that incentives to agree to, and comply with, 
specific standards of restraint are distributed unevenly.
VI. Cosmopolitan Standards of Restraint
Because of its association with notions of cultural superiority the idea of 
civilization has lost its prominent position in the ethical defence of cosmopolitan 
political projects (Jackson, 2000, p. 408). But various legal developments 
including the rise of the humanitarian laws of war from the middle of the 
nineteenth century and the war crimes tribunals at the end of the Second World 
War were explicitly connected with the conscience of ‘civilized’ peoples. 
Western societies have been the driving-force behind the globalisation of 
‘civilized’ liberal harm conventions that command widespread but far from 
universal support. Many contemporary Western political initiatives are testimony 
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to the continuing influence of nineteenth-century liberal-internationalist 
convictions such as the thesis that the spread of liberalism will promote world 
peace. Empirical support for the contention that liberal states have a special 
relationship with each other – because they have broken with the age-old 
practice of using force to resolve major disputes – has been linked with the 
conviction that it is possible to transform international society as a whole by 
globalising human rights, supporting democracy promotion, and universalising 
the commitment to free trade (see Gat, 2006, Ch. 16). 
Whether or not that conjecture proves to be optimistic, it is clear that 
Enlightenment suppositions about the moderating effect of commerce, and 
related anticipations of the positive evaluation of ‘ordinary life’, are closer to 
being realised in the liberal sphere of peace than in other parts of international 
society. Liberal optimism about the possibility of transforming world politics so 
that all peoples can live non-violently rests on the assumption that, despite their 
cultural and other differences, most people hope to prolong life for as long as 
possible without the burden of unnecessary or relievable pain and suffering. The 
universal human rights culture and international criminal law represent a victory 
for the liberal belief that, despite cultural and other differences, most people 
wish to be free from unjustifiable harm and eradicable suffering. There are 
always two sides to such social processes. Societies that find gratuitous violence 
disturbing and distasteful, and that no longer regard warfare as central to their 
collective identity or to masculine self-esteem, may find it difficult to understand 
peoples that ‘lag behind’ because of ‘irrational’ attachments to violent struggle. 
An apparent inability to resolve differences peacefully may be regarded as 
evidence of atavism and irrationalism. It is a short step to exasperation with 
groups that seemingly cannot be assisted and who are – for many ‘civilized’ 
peoples – not worth trying to help (Linklater, 2014). The ‘new barbarism thesis’ 
refers precisely to supposedly atavistic cultural traits that are presumed to 
explain why ‘pre-modern’ peoples are prone to commit acts of violence that 
have been eliminated from – and are often represented as an inexplicable assault 
on, and danger to – ‘civilized’ societies (Jacoby, 2011).
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Analyses of liberal pacification have not been connected with the 
examination of the civilizing process but that phenomenon is a perfect 
illustration of how ‘civilized’ attitudes to violent harm (that influenced 
campaigns to abolish public execution and the death penalty as well as judicial 
torture and associated cruel punishments) have reshaped international society. It 
is important to add that the analysis of the European civilizing process reveals 
that liberal attitudes to violent harm must be seen in conjunction with the 
compulsions of interdependence and with changes in the ways in which people 
came to be bound together. State formation, the shifting balance of power 
between external and inner constraints, and changing levels of repugnance 
towards cruelty and violence, evolved as part of the same process of civilization. 
Normative shifts did not precede those other transformations, and they were not 
the principal driving force behind them, but nor were they mere garlands thrown 
over, and designed to conceal, the self-interested behaviour of the dominant 
social strata. Moral concerns about how ‘civilized’ societies should conduct their 
foreign policy are an offshoot of the processes that forced peoples together and 
confronted them with the challenge of learning how to co-exist peacefully. As 
argued earlier, the normative shifts that are part of a modern international ethic 
have taken place in large measure because of the urgent need to control 
revolutions in destructive capabilities; they have had more to do with controlling 
such dangers than with promoting emotional identification between peoples as 
an absolute end in itself, although that is an intrinsically-valuable ideal for many 
people and a major influence on their behaviour. The major power’s involvement 
in embedding a principle of humaneness in international society has occurred 
however not because modern peoples are ‘better’ than their ancestors but 
because they have different sensibilities that reflect amongst other things the 
dangers they imposed on one another in the age of total warfare.
The liberal peace and efforts to promote liberal-democratic values are 
evidence of how the ethical sensibilities that distinguish highly-pacified societies 
from male warrior cultures have globalised a unique civilizing process and led 
to an international society that is radically different from earlier states-systems 
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in the West. Collective efforts to spread liberal principles demonstrate the part 
that the ‘harm principle’ has played in promoting the complex interweaving of 
domestic and international principles of legitimacy (Linklater, 2011, Ch. 2). As 
noted earlier, various international legal conventions are testimony to its 
influence. They include the humanitarian laws of warfare that were established 
to reduce ‘superfluous injury’ and ‘unnecessary suffering’, the universal human 
rights culture, the recent notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ and, finally 
international criminal law that is anchored in the liberal tenet that individuals – 
whether military leaders and personnel under their command – will be held 
personally responsible for violating the laws of war.(3)
The innovations that have just been described express collective sensibilities 
that are closely associated with the liberal ‘harm principle’ and specifically with 
the moral conviction that ‘cruelty is the worst thing we do’. There is no better 
example of the limitations of the thesis that little of substance has changed in the 
relations between states over the centuries, and no better illustration of how the 
idea of civilization has been consciously deployed to transform the dominant 
understandings about forms of violence that are permissible or forbidden. The 
point has been made that agreements on the relevant standards is often 
precarious. Realism provides the important reminder that ‘military necessity’ 
can lead to the collapse of global harm conventions that are designed to 
minimise suffering in war. The aerial bombardment of German and Japanese 
cities during the Second World War demonstrated how quickly ‘civilized’ 
societies could relax the social taboos against mass slaughter when they 
calculated that such behaviour was necessary for victory, or for survival in the 
case of British policy. ‘Civilized’ societies have weakened similar restraints on 
Those developments are highly ambiguous. The notion of the responsibility to protect became 
linked ‘post 9/11’ with the doctrine of the state’s international obligations not to harbour 
terrorist organisations that were deemed to be ‘the enemies of civilization’ (Reinold, 2013, Ch. 
4). The failure to honour that obligation exposed the ‘outlaw’ state in question to external 
intervention on the part of ‘injured states’ that professed to be the custodians of new global 
standards expressed in ‘hegemonic international law’ (Reinold, 2013, p. 117). 
(3)
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force in several conflicts in non-Western regions in the more recent period. Even 
so, it is important to move beyond ‘process-reducing’ perspectives such as neo-
realism to identify and explain the changing standards of self-restraint that are 
embedded in the evolving practices of international society. One consequence is 
that the state’s freedom of manoeuvre and ability to escape international 
accountability have declined notably. That change cannot be reversed without 
first overcoming significant public resistance to superfluous injury that is now a 
significant part of the social habitus. Although the phenomenon has not been 
discussed in the following terms, greater public concern about the indiscriminate 
and disproportionate killing of civilians has been a major feature of Western 
(and also non-Western) civilizing processes in recent years (Bellamy, 2012; 
Thomas, 2001). But as discussed earlier, public tolerance of civilian casualties 
remains high when it is believed that national military personnel will be killed 
or injured in military encounters in unacceptable numbers, and particularly when 
‘advanced’ peoples think they may be engaged in a struggle with untameable 
‘atavistic’ social forces that do not observe ‘civilized’ constraints. 
Contemporary international society has turned an important corner by 
granting cosmopolitan standards of self-restraint a central place in its principal 
global harm conventions. That transformation reflects the moral belief that the 
institutions of international society are to be judged not only by how far they 
help to maintain order between the great powers but also by the extent to which 
they address the needs of vulnerable peoples (Clark, 2013). The whole 
movement illustrates the unprecedented influence of the idea of human equality 
on international relations (Buzan and Little, 2000, p. 340). It supports the claim 
that ‘revulsion against the use of violence is growing’ (Elias, 2013c, p. 226), and 
the contention that at no other time ‘have so many people had so high a 
threshold of sensitivity in relation to...acts of physical violence’ (Elias, 2013d, p. 
253). Cosmopolitan harm conventions that affirm the equal right of every person 
to be free from cruelty, unnecessary violence, and degrading and humiliating 
treatment irrespective of citizenship, nationality or ethnicity, or race and gender 
are core elements of a global ethic with universalistic and egalitarian 
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underpinnings that had little influence in earlier periods. The usual caveats apply 
and no assumption is made that those achievements are permanent or that further 
advances are inevitable. What is distinctive about the contemporary era is the 
existence of various regimes that encourage compliance with standards of 
restraint in the context of international anarchy (Keohane, 1984). Various global 
non-governmental organisations that defend humanitarian responsibilities before 
the court of ‘world opinion’ have also been influential in applying pressure on 
states to comply with global legal and ethical standards (Stearns, 2005). By 
drawing public attention to excessive violence and by seeking to shame or 
punish those who breach harm conventions that embody current cosmopolitan 
principles of legitimacy, those associations have ensured that the retreat from the 
relevant standards of self-restraints does not go unchallenged.
The liberal civilizing offensive emerged in particular historical 
circumstances and in the context of specific social and power conflicts. For 
example, in the bipolar era the promotion of the universal human rights culture 
was closely linked with the United States’ defence of civilized ‘Western values’ 
in its rivalry with the ‘totalitarian’ Soviet Union (Clark, 2007, Ch. 6). Such 
political dynamics will continue to influence global civilizing offensives and 
lead to questions about the authenticity of supposedly universal, emancipatory 
projects (Peterson, 2013). As already noted, some authors stress major parallels 
between colonial, ‘civilizing’ missions and recent ‘transformative invasions’ that 
have combined ‘humanitarian’, liberal-democratic projects with the objective of 
securing social and political outcomes that suit great power interests 
(Feichtinger, Malinowski and Richards, 2012). The significant achievements of 
the expansion of international society have been discussed. The contemporary 
prominence of humanitarian endeavours reflects failures of that process, 
specifically the violent consequences of state-formation and ‘failed states’ in 
several regions. Many Western societies have promoted state-building or re-
building initiatives that reflect earlier phases of their civilizing process and a 
continuing desire to promote its globalisation. Western responses to crises of the 
state in former colonised regions provide a window onto the current phase of a 
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civilizing process that first developed in Europe. Debates about humanitarian 
intervention, efforts to reconstruct war-torn societies, and measures to ensure 
democracy promotion and support for human rights are all connected with that 
earlier process of civilization. They are manifestations of changing standards of 
civilization. 
A recurrent criticism of cosmopolitan standards of self-restraint is that the 
liberal-concentration on controlling the state’s monopoly powers has authorised 
a broad relaxation of constraints on global business corporations and a 
corresponding emancipation of market forces. Conduct that was once permitted 
in relations between states is now checked or forbidden; actions that were once 
restrained in the economic domain are not only permissible but have been 
widely encouraged. The constraints of conscience are less evident there. A 
parallel argument is that achievements in restraining the state’s capacity to inflict 
violent harm on its own citizens and in its external relations have not been 
accompanied by collective efforts to protect people from the levels of 
transnational economic and environmental harm that advances in global 
pacification have made possible. The contention is that the liberal project has not 
recognised the need for, and has often impeded, efforts to create cosmopolitan 
restraints that keep pace with the globalisation of economic and social relations. 
That political shortcoming is not unconnected with domestic unrest and 
instability in several societies, but the dangers are not limited to them. Long-
term dangers of global social and political instability – and concomitant 
pressures on restraint on violence – cannot be ignored. For the critics, Western 
liberal complacency compromises a ‘civilizing’ project which is deemed to be 
little more than an instrument for perpetuating forms of Western political and 
economic hegemony that fail large sections of the world’s population. Their 
standpoint highlights the problem of ‘organised irresponsibility’, an expression 
that refers to permissive legal frameworks that ensure the ‘non-liability’ of 
actors with respect to, inter alia, unintended harm to others or negligent damage 
to the physical environment (Veitch, 2007, 114ff). Such standpoints are central 
to a more comprehensive analysis of violence and civilization than the current 
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discussion can provide.
VII. Towards an Explanation of Global Civilizing Processes
The main objective of this section is to take some preliminary steps towards 
an explanation of civilizing processes in modern world politics. A useful 
starting-point is the link between state formation and the process of civilization. 
Stable, state monopolies of power have been critical for the existence of 
relatively-high levels of personal security in complex societies; they have also 
been the sine qua non of international civilizing processes. The modern state 
contributed to a global civilizing process by replacing mercenary forces that 
caused human misery by living off the land with more disciplined, professional 
militaries that were more answerable to the standards of self-restraint in 
‘civilized’ societies. Similar points are evident in English School arguments 
about ‘the state’s positive role in world affairs’ which stressed that successful 
state formation simultaneously solves some of the problems that people have 
had in living together non-violently but also creates new ones (Bull, 1979). 
The effective monopolisation of coercive power removed some of the 
dangers that people face when they relied on themselves for their security. It 
disarmed and disabled violent factions; it imposed external constraints on rival 
groups and fostered the recognition that political compromise was necessary to 
maintain a public order that was in their long-term interests. Where a strong we-
identity did develop within the state, it was often connected with violence 
towards domestic enemies that included physical expulsion, a strategy that 
risked external intervention by supporters (Elias, 2006b; Rae, 2002). Early 
modern European states addressed the problem by embedding a principle of 
religious toleration in the Westphalian settlement. They understood that 
international order depended on a delicate balance between asserting sovereign 
rights to political independence and supporting international standards of self-
restraint that contributed to peaceful co-existence. 
The existence of multiple power monopolies creates a high probability of 
struggles for power and security as well as attendant dangers that major 
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disagreements will be resolved by violence. The breakdown of military 
discipline in warfare has been one reason for the perpetration of what have come 
to be known as ‘war crimes’. Even in the case of disciplined armies, major 
atrocities can take place. What are the pressures and incentives that encourage 
self-restraint? The most obvious factor is reciprocity. As various informal and 
formal agreements to exchange prisoners of war have revealed, the fragile reed 
of reciprocity is often the key to observing specific standards of self-restraint. 
What has been described as the ‘durability’ of social encounters – the likelihood 
that the different parties will ‘meet again’ – underpinned the ‘civilizing’ practice 
of prisoner exchange in Europe (Parker, 2002, p. 161, p. 167). Each side 
understood that the return of its military personnel depended on mutual restraint; 
each understood that slaughtering prisoners would provoke retaliation and 
retribution. Reciprocity depended on a relatively even distribution of power 
between interdependent groups. The corollary is exemplified by the relations 
between European colonisers and indigenous peoples. Where there are serious 
power inequalities – where the weaker parties cannot retaliate or withhold 
significant benefits when they are harmed – then the stronger groups have a 
greatly-reduced incentive to exercise self-restraint (Cell, 1979; Keohane, 1989). 
That is a crucial theme in process sociology and in the English School analysis 
of the importance of the balance of power for the survival of the restraints that 
define an international society.
Prisoner exchange depends on restraints on violent behaviour that may 
spring from anger and the thirst for revenge. It is connected with the ability to 
replace highly-emotive behaviour that offers immediate gratification with a more 
rational, long-term, approach to a shared predicament. As noted above, the 
realisation that states are part of the same ‘production line’, and cannot behave 
exactly as they please without a high probability of costs that are equivalent to 
the harms they cause, injected ‘civilizing’ dynamics into relations between the 
great powers. The sheer scale of the destruction that could be inflicted in periods 
of warfare had a taming effect. Nowhere was the survival value of the human 
capacity for restraining violence more evident than in the bipolar era. It also 
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revealed that international harm conventions that embody shared understandings 
about the imperative of controlling the use of force invariably depend on a 
balance of military power where no state can behave as it pleases without the 
risk of violent reprisal (Dunne, 2003).
The English School has made an important distinction between a ‘fortuitous’ 
balance of power that is the unplanned outcome of geopolitical competition and 
struggles for hegemony, and a ‘contrived’ balance of power that represents a 
major advance in great power cooperation (Bull, 2001, p. 101). The contrived 
balance of power is an example of how a high level of self-regulation and self-
restraint can emerge for reasons of enlightened self-interest. During the Cold 
War years, unprecedented destructive force increased ‘the social constraints 
towards self-constraint’ that was fundamental to the contrived equilibrium of the 
balance of terror. Neo-liberal scholars have provided an interesting variant on 
such analyses of the incentives for exercising self-control by arguing that 
international agreements are durable when states must face each other again and 
again in international organisations that were established to manage ‘complex 
interdependence’. Analysts have described how states can restrain each other by 
shaming actual or potential defectors from cooperative mechanisms and by 
imposing tangible reputational costs (Keohane, 1984). The discussion points to 
significant shifts in the relative power of external and internal restraints – in the 
reduced importance of the fear of physical coercion in creating incentives to 
exercise self-restraint and the increased influence of pressures to conform to 
global standards that societies impose on themselves and on each other within 
international organisations. There is a useful link to be made with the analysis of 
the civilizing effects of national and global ‘meeting regimes’ in process 
process-sociology (Van Vree, 1999).
Wight (1977, Ch. 1) argued that societies that regard themselves as 
belonging to the same civilization – one centred on the rights of sovereign rulers 
in the case of modern Europe – have certain common orientations towards the 
social world that facilitate the quest for agreements on basic principles of 
international co-existence. A shared civilizational identity may enhance their 
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prospects of creating ‘meeting regimes’ and accepting certain standards of 
restraint. Wight added that simply being part of the same civilization provides 
no guarantee that state will abide by ‘civilized’ standards, especially when 
dealing with enemies. Even so, it was often the case that what states have 
accomplished in the way of creating international or cosmopolitan harm 
conventions has been influenced by the extent to which they identified with the 
same civilization, as was the case with the Greek city-states and with European 
societies prior to the expansion of international society. A shared ‘civilized’ 
identity can have a restraining role on acts of violence that are regarded as 
‘barbaric’ and as the hallmark of ‘savages’. A double standard of morality may 
exist however. During the Second World War, for example, German armed 
forces respected certain standards of restraint with respect to the treatment of 
prisoners of war that were captured on the Western front. In relations with the 
Russian ‘barbarian’ on the East, the ‘civilized’ rules did not apply. 
The contrast with ‘savages’ is critical. Social identities that are anchored in 
identification with the same civilization rest on cultural dichotomies that expose 
outsiders to the danger of extreme violence. ‘Civilized’ identities may have 
encouraged evenly-balanced societies to place controls on violence in their 
relations with one another. Their other side is not just the absence of ‘we-feeling’ 
with outsiders but derogatory representations that licence or authorise levels of 
force against them that are generally condemned as cruel or needlessly violent 
within the ‘civilized’ world. Widespread compliance with the rules of war in the 
eighteenth century owed a great deal to the reality that military elites believed 
that they were part of the same civilization, or thought they belonged to a 
transnational elite that was the chief custodian of ‘civilized’ values (van Crefeld, 
1989, Ch. 19). Such conceptions of the restraining role of the laws of war did 
not apply in relations with ‘savages’ in the colonised world. 
Those are instances of a more general phenomenon which is that a civilizing 
process that is common to the separate but interdependent members of an 
international society can find expression in the harm conventions that tie them 
together. The honour code that united hoplite warriors in the classical Greek 
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city-states underpinned specific restraints on inter-city violence. Medieval 
knights departed for battle in the belief that the defeated might be ransomed 
rather than summarily executed. In both cases, the harm conventions that were 
central to a specific civilizing process restricted certain rights to members of the 
warrior elite. Collective privileges were not shared with ‘social inferiors’. Those 
examples further indicate that ideas of civilization prohibit some forms of 
violence and permit or even demand others that can include the extermination of 
enemies. 
In the examples given, civilized self-restraints on force did not depend on 
egalitarian commitments. The idea of human equality had little political 
significance in the earlier states-systems in the West or, indeed, in the modern 
society of states until recently. The main restraints on harm could function 
without that ideal but, clearly, that is no longer the case. At least for now, a 
unique global civilizing process that is suffused with universal and egalitarian 
values is in place. Pressures to demonstrate that foreign policy complies with, or 
does not openly contradict, the principle of human equality illustrate the point. 
In the recent phase of the European/Western civilizing process, commitments to 
egalitarian principles underpin ideas of human rights and support for legal 
sanctions against those who are found guilty of abusing the rights of prisoners of 
war. The existence of those practices marks a major change in the relationship 
between the external restraints that increased as a result of higher levels of 
destructive power and the internal restraints that are associated with the more 
positive characteristics of a civilizing process that were noted earlier (see 
footnote two). That shift explains why states are now expected to balance their 
national and international responsibilities with humanitarian obligations that 
include support for the laws of war and the human rights culture. 
As part of the civilizing process, the idea that the civilian as an equal human 
being should be spared unnecessary suffering has acquired a moral significance 
that it did not possess in the earlier Western states-systems; indeed, no special 
category of civilians with special rights to be spared violent or non-violent harm 
existed in those times (Slim, 2008); also Bellamy (2012, Introduction and Ch. 
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1). Profound shifts in social attitudes to the rights of civilians occurred in the 
period between the French Revolution and the post-Second World War era. 
Support for civilian immunity was initially anchored in the principle of 
reciprocity, as were the rules pertaining to the return of unharmed prisoners of 
war, but it has become ‘internalised’ in the world-views of many societies, or at 
least ‘embedded’ in international law with the result that blatant violations now 
provoke widespread condemnation (Thomas, 2001, Ch. 2). That development 
was a response to the peculiar paradox that was highlighted earlier, namely that 
modern peoples who are accustomed to low levels of violence in relations within 
their society, acquired destructive capabilities that jeopardised domestic 
achievements. Societies were compelled to deal with the reality that they had 
become more dangerous to each other; their response reflected the influence of 
ideas of human equality that moved to the centre of civilized societies as a result 
of various ‘emancipation struggles’ that were part of a major shift in the power 
gradient between dominant and subordinate groups. Humanitarian projects that 
reflect public sympathies for the victims of military conflicts – including now 
the plight of women in war – are part of that legacy, as are the various 
international governmental and non-governmental organisations that have 
pioneered the global protection of human rights. They are evidence of changing 
power balances between the state, international non-governmental organisations 
and the rights of individual persons - or between international and world society.
Egalitarian values have been pivotal to the development of humanitarian 
responsibilities that aim, inter alia, to reduce poverty and to promote global 
health. Those obligations remain weak relative to national and international 
responsibilities, but the very fact that that the members of the society of states 
address such problems at all deserves comment. Such human concerns were not 
priorities in the earlier Western states-systems or in their constitutive parts. Only 
in the very recent period have they become principal features of world politics. 
Various normative visions exist of how the idea of equality can give direction to 
a global civilizing process with the more positive characteristics mentioned 
earlier. They confront the insecurities of those who are most exposed to the 
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negative effects of rising levels of global interconnectedness including 
vulnerability to exploitation, unjust enrichment and other forms of non-violent 
harm. They are evidence of a partial widening of the scope of emotional 
identification so that duties to co-nationals do not exhaust the sense of moral 
responsibility to other people. Those social resources demonstrate the immanent 
potential for a more radical transformation of the relative power of national, 
international and humanitarian responsibilities; they are invaluable cultural 
reserves that can be harnessed to resist future efforts to contract the scope of 
moral consideration. That is one reason why current endeavours to give concrete 
meaning to ideas of world or cosmopolitan citizenship are imperative. All such 
concepts are critical to political efforts to promote new forms of ‘conscience 
formation’.
A related question is how far those who identify with a specific civilization 
recognise the problems that their ways of life create by virtue of pernicious 
distinctions between the ‘advanced’ and the ‘backward’. The issue is whether 
they think of civilization in the singular – as a set of traits that they alone possess 
– or believe that different peoples have undergone distinctive civilizing 
processes with value in their own right. As noted earlier, the ‘radical 
Enlightenment’ highlighted the ambiguities of ‘civilization’ and promoted 
greater detachment from modern ways of life. Its members revealed that 
‘civilization’ was a barrier to transformed relations between European and non-
European peoples that brought an end to imperial cruelties, if not to colonialism 
itself. The expansion of international society is testimony to success in 
weakening the sense of civilized superiority.
One approach to the consequences of that change for world politics 
maintains that states may be ‘consciously working out, for the first time, a set of 
trans-cultural values and ethical standards’ (Watson, 1987, p. 152). That 
observation was connected with a central dimension of English School inquiry 
which is the combination of satisfaction that non-Western societies have largely 
accepted European principles of international relations with concerns about the 
continuing challenge of ensuring that the society of states acquires greater 
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legitimacy in the eyes of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged peoples 
(Vincent, 1986). Disputes about classical liberal perspectives that privilege civil 
and political rights over social and economic rights are symptomatic of the more 
general problem. They have raised important questions about how far the most 
affluent groups are so trapped in parochial world-views that they cannot 
understand radical discontent amongst subordinate groups or respond 
sympathetically to their pleas to have their interests taken more seriously. 
Moreover, because members of the contemporary international society do 
not regard see themselves as part of the same civilization, they face a greater 
challenge than their predecessors did in agreeing on global principles that should 
be observed not only in their relations with each other but also within their 
respective national boundaries. The expansion of international society is 
evidence of success in identifying principles of co-existence that bridge 
substantial cultural differences, although there is obviously much to do to 
achieve ‘effective political dialogue and cooperation’ between the societies 
involved - and a great deal to accomplish by way of acquiring the level of 
detachment from specific cultural horizons that is necessary if efforts to promote 
global agreements about standards of restraint are not to be dismissed as 
attempts to impose an alien ‘standard of civilization’ on others (Elias, 2012, p. 
453). Advances in that domain are critical if radically different peoples who 
have been forced together over the last few centuries are to succeed in planning 
a global civilizing process that is organised around voluntary agreements on how 
to promote ‘the non-violent co-existence of human beings’ (Elias, 2013a, p. 
186). 
Several parallels exist between the conditions that led to the European 
civilizing process and contemporary global entanglements that create pressures 
to acquire higher levels of detachment from specific cultural standpoints and 
social locations. In both cases, lengthening and deepening webs of 
interconnectedness provided the impetus for more ‘civilized’, restrained 
orientations to other peoples. Those dynamics are the reason for major 
differences between the contemporary phase of international society and the 
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preceding eras in the history of the Western states-systems. They explain why it 
is possible to think of a global civilizing process that has its origins in Europe 
but is outgrowing the West in uneven and controversial ways.
VIII. Conclusion
Elias (2012, p. 589) analysed the European civilizing process but stressed 
that it was one of many that included China with its longer history of internal 
pacification. Other process sociologists have argued for a comparative study of 
civilizing processes, Western and non-Western (see Mennell, 1996). Such an 
investigation would contribute to Elias’s defence of more detached and less 
ethnocentric analyses of very long-term processes in the development of human 
societies. Analysing such patterns would take up the challenge of the nineteenth 
century universal histories which had failed because of erroneous assumptions 
about progress, teleology and the superiority of European civilization. The 
critique of such grand narratives had led most social scientists to ‘retreat into the 
present’, believing that the study of long-term processes was permanently 
discredited (Elias, 2009). However, the ‘[baby had been thrown out with the 
bathwater’ (Elias, 2012, p. 512). The challenge was to take a long-term 
perspective on societies that focused on changes that had affected humanity as a 
whole. 
The study of international relations has a vital role to play in rehabilitating 
such grand narratives. A central task is to understand how the webs of human 
interconnectedness have lengthened over the centuries and millennia. As part of 
that endeavour, it is important to analyse how different civilizing processes have 
shaped and been shaped by each other (see Hobson, 2004), and how the lives of 
distant peoples became more closely interwoven as a result. Non-Western 
perspectives can contribute to such an analysis of long-term patterns of change 
by correcting the biases of the dominant Western approaches that have mainly 
concentrated on social and political dynamics in the West (Hobson, 2012). Those 
biases were a function of the prevalent global power balances during the 
emergence, consolidation and growth of the academic study of international 
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relations. They reflected the political and economic dominance of Europe or the 
West. Arguments for constructing non-Western approaches are connected with 
current and predicted changes in global power relations, and most obviously 
with the rise of China. From the standpoint of process sociology, such 
perspectives can provide valuable insights into how different peoples and their 
civilizing processes became interconnected before, during and after the colonial 
expansions of the West. They can shed new light on the power relations that 
were intrinsic to those patterns of change and on their enduring effects on 
contemporary peoples. 
Elias maintained that one of the purposes of the social sciences is to provide 
‘realistic’ knowledge about human society that can help people to orientate 
themselves to very long-term patterns of change including rapid and largely 
unforeseen developments. A central aim, it was argued, was to contribute to 
understanding how peoples can learn to live together non-violently and amicably 
– in short, how they can reach agreements about what is permissible and 
forbidden in their relations with each other. Elias’s analysis of long-term changes 
in the West provides a model to follow in the examination of various non-
Western civilizing processes and in related investigations of how they became 
linked together and interwoven in global webs of interconnectedness. The 
analysis of standards of self-restraint that has been undertaken in this paper may 
provide some clues about how to promote a more comprehensive inquiry that 
examines diverse civilizing processes as well as the moral and political questions 
about the ‘permissible’ and the ‘forbidden’ that have arisen with the emergence 
of the first universal society of states. Such an inquiry may open new lines of 
investigation for students of the role of violence in the relations between human 
communities.
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<Summary>
Andrew Linklater 
The process sociologist, Norbert Elias (2012, p. 89) maintained that Caxton’s 
comment in his fifteenth century treatise on courtesy that ‘things that were once 
permitted are now forbidden’ could stand as the ‘motto’ for the European civiliz-
ing process that was to come. The main course of development which would re-
volve around the formation of modern states and the significant pacification of the 
relevant societies shaped different related spheres of social interaction. According 
to Elias, they included the standards that governed bodily functions, changes in 
table manners and (of particular importance for the present discussion) shifts in 
emotional responses to cruelty and violence. His writings were less consistent on 
the subject of whether actions that were once permitted in relations between states 
have become forbidden in the most recent phase of the modern states-system. The 
main objective of the following discussion is to synthesise elements of process 
sociology and the English School in order to determine whether the current era is 
distinctive if not unique.

